The Fall of the Empire
The kingdom oil built, the alliances it bought, and the war it cannot yet buy its way out of.
Saudi Arabia was not handed to anyone. Between 1902 and 1932, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud fought a three-decade campaign to unify the Arabian Peninsula's rival territories under his own rule, defeating even Britain's own allies in the Hejaz along the way, and proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 23, 1932 — seven years before the Second World War had even begun. What turned that kingdom into a superpower wasn't conquest; it was what sat beneath it. Oil, discovered in 1938, gave Riyadh control over the swing production that set the price of energy for the entire industrialized world. The kingdom proved exactly how much leverage that bought in October 1973: when the United States backed Israel against Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War, OAPEC's Arab members shut off the taps. Oil quadrupled from roughly $3 to $12 a barrel. American gas stations rationed fuel by license plate — odd numbers on odd days — and the lines wrapped around city blocks for five months, until the embargo finally lifted in March 1974. It was the clearest demonstration in modern history that a kingdom built on sand could bring the world's most powerful economy to a standstill.
But the dollar Saudi Arabia was paid in had already lost its anchor. Since 1944, it had been pegged to gold at $35 an ounce under the Bretton Woods system, with the rest of the world's currencies pegged to it in turn — until France's Charles de Gaulle, calling it America's "exorbitant privilege," began physically flying gold out of the Federal Reserve's vaults in 1965, repatriating over 3,300 tonnes and starting a run that West Germany and Britain joined by 1971. On August 15 of that year, Richard Nixon closed the gold window entirely, and for three years the dollar simply floated, backed by nothing. So in the summer of 1974 — mere months after the embargo that had just proven Saudi Arabia's leverage over the world's energy supply — Treasury Secretary Bill Simon and Henry Kissinger struck the deal that would define the next fifty years: Riyadh would price its oil exclusively in dollars and recycle the proceeds into US Treasuries, and Washington would guarantee the kingdom's security in return. Within a year, every OPEC member had followed. The dollar had found something better than gold — the one commodity every industrialized nation needed and only a handful of countries controlled.
Saudi Arabia spent the rest of the decade absorbing what it had just bought. It took 25 percent ownership of Aramco in 1973, 60 percent in 1974, and full control by 1980 — the oil that once flowed through an American company now flowed entirely through the state. Then, in 1979, the ground shifted three times in one year. Iran's revolution replaced the Shah with a Shia theocracy across the Gulf, an existential threat to a Sunni monarchy's claim to legitimacy. On November 20, Juhayman al-Otaybi led over two hundred armed men to seize the Grand Mosque in Mecca itself, proclaiming his brother-in-law the Mahdi; the two-week siege ended in mass execution, and it pushed the monarchy toward even stricter religious conservatism to shore up its own legitimacy, funding Wahhabi export around the world as it did. Weeks later, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia — alongside the United States and Pakistan — bankrolled the mujahideen resistance that would incubate a generation of jihadists, a young Osama bin Laden among them.
The kingdom's oil leverage nearly broke it next. Saudi Arabia played swing producer through the early 1980s, slashing its own output from 10 million barrels a day to just 2.3 million by August 1985 trying to hold prices up while the rest of OPEC quietly overproduced anyway. Riyadh finally gave up and flooded the market instead — the price collapsed from $23.29 to $9.85 a barrel within months, a first hard lesson in what defending the world's oil price actually costs the defender.
Then came the break that mattered most. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, bin Laden offered the Saudi government 100,000 of his own mujahideen to defend the kingdom rather than invite "infidel" troops onto the land of Islam's two holiest sites. Riyadh considered it, then rejected him under American pressure and invited the US-led coalition instead. From that moment, bin Laden turned on the Saudi monarchy itself, not just Washington — he was stripped of his citizenship in 1994. The Khobar Towers bombing killed nineteen American servicemen in June 1996, usually attributed to Iran-linked Saudi Hezbollah rather than al-Qaeda, though bin Laden welcomed it publicly. The chain that started with a petrodollar handshake in 1974 ended, on September 11, 2001, with fifteen of the nineteen hijackers carrying Saudi passports.
The petrodollars kept flowing long after 2001, and Saudi Arabia poured them into rebuilding itself from scratch. Since 2016, the kingdom has announced more than $1 trillion in giga-projects beyond NEOM alone: $63.2 billion for Diriyah Gate, a recreation of the House of Saud's original 18th-century capital; $23.6 billion for the Red Sea Project's ultra-luxury resort islands; $23 billion for King Salman Park; $13 billion for Qiddiya's 21 planned entertainment districts. In western Saudi Arabia alone, 17 giga-projects carried a combined $431.3 billion in contracts by 2025. This was a country with no public cinemas until 2018 and no legal concerts for decades, trying to build an entire entertainment economy in under a ten-year span — not incrementally, but all at once, everywhere, funded by a sovereign wealth fund with nowhere near infinite patience.
Golf was the clearest test of what that money could buy. The Public Investment Fund launched LIV Golf in October 2021 and poured more than $2 billion into its first season alone, luring stars away from the PGA Tour with $25 million purses and Greg Norman as the face of the operation. It nearly worked: in June 2023 the PGA Tour, LIV, and the DP World Tour announced a shock merger framework — negotiated so secretly that Norman himself, LIV's own commissioner, found out about it minutes before it broke on CNBC. Then it stalled. No deal had closed by 2026, Norman was quietly replaced as CEO that January, and the PIF began winding down funding after the 2026 season. Along the way, 9/11 families' groups repeatedly confronted the PGA Tour for partnering with the same government whose nationals made up fifteen of the nineteen hijackers — the empire's oil money and its original sin, showing up at the same negotiating table.
Boxing went further, faster. Turki Alalshikh's General Entertainment Authority turned Riyadh into the sport's new capital almost overnight: 67 fighters and 14 world title fights across Riyadh Season events in a single twelve-month stretch, with Tyson Fury and Oleksandr Usyk combining for more than $100 million in purses for their two undisputed heavyweight title fights alone — money that, by every account, no promoter outside a sovereign wealth fund could have offered. Comedy was next: the Riyadh Comedy Festival booked Dave Chappelle, Kevin Hart, Bill Burr, Aziz Ansari, and dozens more for fees between $350,000 and $1.6 million each. Chappelle told the crowd it was "easier to talk here than it is in America" — a claim that looked considerably shakier once it emerged performers had signed contracts explicitly barring any joke that could "defame" Saudi Arabia, its royal family, its legal system, or its religion. Human Rights Watch called the whole festival a deflection from the government's actual record on dissidents; fellow comedians like Marc Maron and Shane Gillis said so publicly and stayed home.
Then came the World Cup. On December 11, 2024, FIFA confirmed Saudi Arabia as host of the 2034 tournament — completely uncontested. The mechanics were almost too convenient to believe: FIFA structured the 2030 World Cup as a six-country, three-continent event spanning South America, Africa, and Europe, which — combined with FIFA's confederation rotation rule — meant only Asia or Oceania was eligible to host in 2034. Australia, the one country plausibly positioned to compete, declined to bid. That left Saudi Arabia alone at the deadline, and FIFA compressed its evaluation process into a fraction of its usual timeline to confirm them. No one has produced a smoking-gun bribe — nothing like the 2015 US indictments that took down FIFA officials over the Qatar bid — but the rotation rule's suspiciously perfect timing, layered on top of an organization with a documented history of bought votes, is exactly why "how did Saudi Arabia end up as the only bidder" remains an open question nobody at FIFA seems eager to answer.
The same money that bought golf, boxing, and comedy bought silence too. On October 2, 2018, Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi walked into the Saudi consulate in Istanbul to collect paperwork for his upcoming wedding — reassured it was safe in a phone call from Khalid bin Salman, the crown prince's own brother and Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Washington. He never walked out. The CIA concluded with high confidence that Mohammed bin Salman himself ordered the killing; Riyadh has denied it to this day. It was the same government, running the same giga-projects lighting up the desert, whose migrant workforce grew 40 percent to 13.2 million people in the five years to 2024 — a workforce in which, Human Rights Watch found, deaths from electrocution, falls, and decapitation on NEOM and World Cup construction sites are routinely misclassified as "natural causes," closing the door on investigation or compensation before it opens. One report traced seventeen individual Nepali workers who died this way. Researchers now warn the coming decade of construction will produce thousands more.
Riyadh's ambitions collided with the rest of the Muslim world too. In the months before October 7, 2023, Mohammed bin Salman was actively negotiating normalization with Israel — the kind of deal only the UAE and Bahrain had dared sign in 2020, and one Hamas's own Yahya Sinwar cited by name as a reason his group needed an "extraordinary act" to derail it. It worked. By September 2024, MBS had walked the offer back entirely, telling Saudi Arabia's Shura Council there would be no relations with Israel without a Palestinian state first — and a late-2023 poll found 96 percent of Saudis wanted every Arab country to sever ties with Israel outright over the Gaza war. The kingdom that had been quietly negotiating its way into the Abraham Accords found itself, within a year, standing with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's hardest line instead.
None of it compares to Yemen. Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition against Yemen's Houthi movement since March 2015, enforcing an air, land, and sea blockade on a country that imports 80 to 90 percent of its food, fuel, and medicine. The UN's own accounting found roughly 377,000 deaths in Yemen between 2015 and early 2022 — 60 percent of them not from bombs or bullets, but from the starvation and collapsed healthcare the blockade itself produced. A cholera outbreak beginning in 2016 killed over 2,000 people in 2017 alone. And the United States didn't just look away — it supplied the bombs. On August 9, 2018, a Saudi airstrike hit a school bus in Dahyan, killing 51 people, 40 of them children, with a 500-pound Lockheed Martin bomb sold to Saudi Arabia under a State Department–approved arms deal. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi eventually called the strike "unjustified." Human Rights Watch called it what the law actually calls it: an apparent war crime, one that put Washington's own fingerprints on the weapon that did it.
Yemen also exposed something else: Saudi Arabia's supposed allies weren't really on its side. Riyadh backed Yemen's internationally recognized government and Islah, an Islamist movement it could tolerate; the UAE, uncomfortable with Islah's Muslim Brotherhood ties, built and funded its own rival proxy instead — the Southern Transitional Council, which wants an independent south Yemen. The UAE even imported fighters from Sudan's Rapid Support Forces to reinforce its Yemeni proxies — the same RSF the US State Department would later formally determine had committed genocide in Darfur, funded in large part through gold smuggled into the UAE itself, $115 billion of it between 2012 and 2022. Saudi Arabia, notably, backs the opposite side of that same Sudanese war, pledging $35 billion to the Port Sudan government battling the RSF — proof that the "allies" running the Gulf's proxy wars have just as often been fighting each other as anyone else.
Syria shows the same pattern with an even uglier finish. From the summer of 2013, Saudi Arabia became the single largest financier and arms supplier to the rebellion trying to topple Bashar al-Assad — buying Yugoslav-era weapons wholesale from Croatia and shipping them through Jordan, paying salaries for Free Syria Army fighters, and running that pipeline through Timber Sycamore, a covert CIA-coordinated program that moved thousands of tons of weaponry worth billions of dollars into the country. In May 2015, Saudi Arabia and Turkey consolidated their support behind a rebel coalition called Jaish al-Fatah — the Army of Conquest — which by their own funding structure included al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's official branch in Syria; Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplied roughly 40 percent of that coalition's money. It wasn't a secret and it wasn't denied at the highest levels: then–Vice President Joe Biden told a Harvard audience outright that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had "poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad, except that the people who were being supplied were al-Nusra, and al Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis." The war that money helped fuel killed somewhere between 500,000 and 656,000 people before it was over.
Then, in August 2017, Saudi Arabia simply walked away — informing the opposition it was disengaging and quietly turning toward reconciliation with the same government it had spent four years and billions of dollars trying to destroy. The reversal became official on May 19, 2023, when the Arab League readmitted Assad's Syria after an eleven-year suspension — not in Cairo or Amman, but at a summit hosted in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with Assad given a warm welcome on Saudi soil. The kingdom that had armed al-Qaeda's Syrian branch to fight him spent the next six years rebuilding its relationship with him instead, culminating in the same government rolling out the red carpet. Half a million dead, and the two sides that mattered most ended up right back at the same table.
The empire's ambitions were always going to be tested by a real war, and this year it got one. In August 2026, Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan — an Article 5–style mutual defense pact, quickly nicknamed the "Muslim NATO," under which any attack on one signatory would be treated as an attack on all three. Saudi Arabia would finance it, Turkey would supply advanced defense technology, Pakistan would supply manpower. Thirty-two days later, the pact faced its first real test: Houthi ballistic missiles and drones struck the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Najran, injuring more than seventy people, including women and children. Turkey and Pakistan did not respond. Neither militarily nor, in any meaningful way, at all. A defense alliance signed with fanfare turned out to be exactly the kind of promise oil money can't actually buy: allies who show up.
The Houthis, meanwhile, finished what they started. By mid-September 2026, Houthi forces controlled the entirety of Yemen's Red Sea coastline along with Perim Island and the Hanish archipelago — total command of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the chokepoint separating the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. Days later, on September 10 and 11, drone strikes launched from Iraqi territory hit Saudi Arabia's East-West Crude Oil Pipeline itself, setting pumping stations ablaze near Riyadh and Medina. Saudi Arabia shut the pipeline down as a precaution — and in doing so lost its own backup plan. That pipeline was the kingdom's alternate route for roughly 5 million barrels of oil a day, built specifically to bypass the Strait of Hormuz by running crude overland to the Red Sea port of Yanbu instead. With Hormuz already effectively closed by Iran, and now Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by the Houthis, the East-West pipeline was the last door out. It's shut too. Saudi Arabia, at the request of Iraq's prime minister, chose not to retaliate.
Then came the ask no oil kingdom wants to make out loud. In late August 2026, Saudi Arabia went to a syndicate of international banks — not a central bank, not the IMF, but ordinary commercial lenders — seeking $6 to $8 billion in loans, a slice of a roughly $58 billion borrowing program built to cover a widening deficit and this year's debt repayments. Total government debt had already climbed to 1.685 trillion riyal by the second quarter of 2026, and the war has only pushed military spending higher since. Riyadh's credit ratings haven't cracked yet — S&P still has it at A+, Moody's at Aa3, both stable — but a kingdom that spent fifty years being the one everyone else borrowed from was now cold-calling banks for a fraction of what it once handed Wall Street on a handshake.
And the allies still haven't come. When Mohammed bin Salman personally asked Donald Trump to intervene against the Houthis, Trump said no — Washington had no appetite for another regional war, and instead cut its own separate arrangement with the Houthis to keep American and Israeli vessels safe, leaving Saudi ships exposed in the same waters. Fifty years after Kissinger promised American protection in exchange for oil priced in dollars, the kingdom asked its oldest guarantor for help and watched it protect someone else's ships instead. That is the isolation this chapter ends on: a defense pact that didn't defend, a pipeline that didn't survive, a superpower's founding patron declining to show up, and a government now borrowing from banks to survive a war it can no longer buy its way out of. Whether that's the moment the empire actually falls, or just the closest it's come to finding out what falling would look like, is the one thing not yet written.
This is the first scroll in an ongoing commentary series from 48th State — new installments roughly every one to two weeks, each one unrolling a story the daily wire can't slow down enough to tell.